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Randy B. Birch, #4197
Attorney for Appellant
2964 West 4700 South, #210
Salt Lake City, UT 84118
Telephone (801) 967-6200
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
CASE NO. 920786-CA
KENNETH BALL
Defendant/Appellant,
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
Appellant Ball contends that the Court has power to grant
Appellant's petition for expungement of his criminal record.
POINT I.

APPELLANT/PETITIONER BALL'S RIGHTS TO AN EXPUNGEMENT
VESTED WHEN HE COMPLETED ALL THE STATUTORY PREREQUISITES

On April 15, 1992, Appellant/Petitioner Kenneth Ball had a
legal right to petition the court for an expungement.

This right

was no different than a right to sue for negligence, breach of
contract, or any other legal remedy.

The actual filing of a

petition is not part of the substantive remedy.

It is simply the

procedural mechanism of enforcing an existing substantive right to
expungement.
from

This right should not be retroactively taken away

Petitioner

Ball,

any

more

that

the

legislature

could

retroactively take away a right to sue for negligence or breach of
contract.

Petitioner Ball agrees with the State's position as set forth
on page 7 of its brief that a party's rights vest when the party
claiming the right is first entitled to institute a judicial
proceeding for the enforcement of his rights. Payne v. Meyers, 743
P.2d 186, 189 (Utah 1987), quoting Am.Jur.2d Actions

§88 (1962).

Applying that rule to this case, it is clear that Petitioner
Kenneth Ball became entitled to an expungement of his criminal
records as of April 15, 1992, the date the order was entered
reducing his conviction to a third degree felony.
The applicable portions of the statute that was in place on
April 15, 1992, §77-18-2, the date Mr. Ball's conviction was
reduced to a third degree felony, sets forth the requirements for
an expungement as follows:
(1) (a) A person convicted of any crime, except a capitol
felony, first degree felony or second degree forcible felony
as defined in subsection 76-2-403(3), within this state may
petition the convicting court for an expungement and for
sealing of his record in that court. The person shall file
both the petition and a certificate issued by the Utah Bureau
of Criminal Identification,....indicating that there is no
record with the bureau of an expungement regarding the
petitioner. ...
(c) The Court shall enter an order to seal all records in the
petitioner's case in the custody of the court or in the
custody of any other court, agency, or official if the court
finds:
(i) the petitioner has not been convicted of a felony or
of a misdemeanor for a period of seven years...
(ii) that no proceeding involving a crime is pending or
being instituted against the petitioner; and
(iii) the petitioner has presented to the court a
certificate issued by the bureau as described in
Subsection (l)(a).
- 2 -

What are the substantive requirements of the statute? Upon a
close review, the requirements that the petitioner must meet are:
1) that he not be convicted of a capitol, 1st, or 2nd degree
felony; 2) that he not have been convicted of a felony or
misdemeanor for seven years; 3) that there not be a pending
criminal proceeding; and 4) that he not have previously received an
expungement.
It is undisputed that Petitioner Kenneth Ball, as of April 15,
1993, the date the order was entered reducing his conviction to a
third degree felony, 1) had not been convicted of a capitol, first,
or second degree felony; 2) since his conviction 12 years ago, Mr.
Ball has not been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor; 2) there
was no pending criminal proceeding against him; and 4) he had not
previously received an expungement.

THE PETITIONER BALL MET ALL

THE SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH LAW! It was in complying with
the procedural requirements of the statute that the problems that
give rise to this appeal were encountered.
The Court should not be mislead into believing, as the State
argues,

that

the

filing

requirements

are

substantive

and

accordingly the Petitioner did not qualify for the expungement.
Literally by its simplest definition, filing requirements are
procedural.

It is true that the Court, in order to grant the

expungement must find all of the above requirements are met, but
the court

so

finding

is different

requirements had been met.

from whether

or not the

It is clear that the requirements had

- 3 -

been met, the problem in the case at bar is that the court has not
yet made the necessary findings.
POINT II

TO DEPRIVE APPELLANT BALL OF AN EXPUNGEMENT IS A
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF A STATUTE AND THE EQUIVALENT
OF AN EX POST FACT LAW

To deprive Petitioner Ball of a vested right based upon a
change of the statute is the equivalent of an ex post facto law,
which laws are prohibited by the United States Constitution,
Article I §9[3], and the Utah Constitution, Article I, §18.
While expungement is arguably a civil remedy or right, its
impact upon Mr. Ball, is equivalent to that of a crime being
committed.

By failing to allow the Petitioner the right to an

expungement, the State of Utah has condemned Kenneth Ball to a
penalty

that

lasts

a

lifetime.

The

application

of

a new

expungement statute to a person who has already qualified for an
expungement

under

application

of

a

the

old

statute

law,

to

constitutes

deprive

the

a

retroactive

Petitioner

substantive rights and must not be allowed by this court.

of

his

As has

been stated by our legislature, "No part of these revised statutes
is retroactive, unless expressly so declared."

§68-3-3, Utah Code

Annotated, 1953 as amended.
The State argues that the petitioner's rights do not vest
until the court actually makes the necessary findings.
red herring issue.

This is a

The right to an expungement vested in the

Petitioner on April 15, 1992; if the Petitioner were to commit a
criminal offense, he may lose those rights, but that does not keep
- 4 -

the right to an expungement from vesting in the Petitioner once he
has complied with all substantive requirements.

CONCLUSION
The 1992 amendment to §77-18-2 is not applicable to Appellant,
to find otherwise would violate §68-3-3 and Utah's prohibition
against retroactive application of substantive laws. Appellant had
begun

the

expungement

process

and

possesses

the

necessary

Eligibility Certificate. Appellant does not fall into the category
or purpose of the legislature, and the statute is unconstitutional
due to internal ambiguities and inconsistencies.
Appellant respectfully requests that the court grant his
petition for expungement.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2J>

day of September, 1993.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this l ^ day of September, 1993, I caused
two true and correct copies of the foregoing to be mailed, postage
prepaid, to Kenneth Bronston, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State
Capitol, SLC, UT 844114.
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Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ORDER REDUCING JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 3521

vs.
KENNETH BALL,

HONORABLE DOUGLAS I. CORNABY
Defendant.

The Motion of the Defendant to reduce judgment of conviction
pursuant to §76-3-402, Utah Code Annotated, came on for hearing on
April 7, 1992, at the hour of 10:00 a.m.

The Defendant was present

and represented by counsel, Randy B. Birch, the County Attorney's
office was also present.
Based upon the motion of the Defendant, no objection of the
County Attorneysfs Office and for good cause appearing, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED, that the conviction of the Defendant be reduced to
a 3rd Degree felony and be recorded as such.
DATED this _/5~ d a Y

of

^aiuh, 1992.

'HONORABLE? DOUGLAS I. C&RNABY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(n) Probation may not be revoked except
upon a hearing in court and a finding that
the conditions of probation have been vio
lated
(b) (1) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging
with particularity facts asserted to consti
tute violation of the conditions of probation
the court that authorized probation shall de
termine if the affidavit establishes probable
cause to believe that revocation, modifica
tion, or extension of probation is justified
(n) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the
defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy
of the affidavit and an order to show cause
why his probation should not be revoked,
modified, or extended
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a
time and place for the hearing and shall be
served upon the defendant at least five days
prior to the hearing
(n) The defendant shall show good cause
for a continuance
(in) The order to show cause shall inform
the defendant of a right to be represented by
counsel at the hearing and to have counsel
appointed for him if he is indigent
(IV) The order shall also inform the defen
dant of a right to present evidence
(d) (1) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit
(u) If the defendant denies the allegations
of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney
shall present evidence on the allegations
(in) The persons who have given adverse
information on which the allegations are
based shall be presented as witnesses subject
to questioning by the defendant unless the
court for good cause otherwise orders
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and
present evidence
(e) (i) Afler the hearing the court shall make
findings of fact
(11) Upon a finding that the defendant vio
lated the conditions of probation the court
may order the probation revoked, modified,
continued, or that the entire probation term
commence anew
(in) If probation is revoked, the defendant
shall be sentenced or the sentence previously
imposed shall be executed
(11) Restitution imposed under this chapter is con
sidered a debt for willful and malicious injury for pur
poses of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy
as provided in Title 11, Section 523, U S C A 1985
(12) The court may order the defendant to commit
himself to the custody of the Division of Mental
Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after
the supenntendent of the Utah State Hospital or his
designee has certified to the court that
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can
benefit from treatment at the state hospital,
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available
for the defendant, and
(c) that persons described in Subsection
62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving priority for treat
ment over the defendants described in this subsection
(13) (a) The department shall make rules in ac
cordance with Chapter 46a, Title 63, Utah Ad

77-18-2

nunistrative Rulemaking Act regarding distlo
sure of presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports to maintain confidentiality of
the report
(b) Disclosure of a presentence investigation
report, including any supplemental diagnostic
evaluation report, is exempt from the provisions
of Chapter 2 Title 63 Government Records Ac
cess and Management Act
1991
77 18 2 Expungement and sealing of records
(1) (a) A person convicted of any crime, except a
capital felony, first degree felony, or second degree forcible felony as defined in Subsection
76 2 402(3), within this state may petition the
convicting court for an expungement and for
sealing of his record in that court The person
shall file both the petition and a certificate issued by the Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification, hereafter referred to as "bureau" in this section, indicating that'there is no record with the
bureau of an expungement regarding the peti
tioner Both documents shall be served upon the
prosecuting attorney The court shall then set a
date for a hearing and notify the prosecuting attorney for the jurisdiction of the date set for hearing Persons having relevant information about
the petitioner may testify at the hearing The
court in its discretion may request a written
evaluation by the adult parole and probation section of the Department of Corrections, except
that a written evaluation is required for any con- J
viction of a sexual offense under Title Yb
'_j
~~J$) A person who at the time o( petition for
expungement has two or more convictions for any
type of felony offense on his record, not arising
out of a single criminal episode, or whose felony
criminal record has been previously expunged is
not eligible for expungement of any of those of
fenses regardless of type or degree of offense
(c) The court shall enter an order to seal all'
records fh the petitioner's case in the custody of
that court or in the custody of any other court,
agency, or official if the court finds }
(0 the petitioner haa not been convicted of
a felony or of a misdemeanor for a period of
seven years in the case of a felony, six years
in the case of an alcohol-related traffic offense under Title 41, five years in the case of
a class A misdemeanor, or three years in the
case of all other misdemeanors or an infrac
tion under Title 76 after his release from in
carceration, parole, or probation, whichever
occurs last,
(n) that no proceeding involving a crime is*
pending or being instituted against the peti
tioner, lind
(in) the petitioner has presented to the
court a certificate issued by the bureau as
descnbecT in Subsection (l)(a)
(d) The court shall issue to the petitioner a certificate stating the court's finding that he has
satisfied the statutory requirements for expunge
ment
(e) The court may not expunge a capital ft 1
ony, first degree felony, or second degree foiut.
felony conviction
(2) (a) When a person has been arrested with or
without a warrant, that individual, after one
month if there have been no intervening arrests
may petition the court in which the proceeding
occurred, or, if there were no court proceedings

A00004

77-18-3

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

any court in the jurisdiction where the arrest occurred, for an order expunging and sealing any
and all records of arrest and detention which
may have been made, if any of the following occurred:
(i) he was released without the filing of
formal charges;
(ii) proceedings against him were dismissed, he was discharged without a conviction and no charges were refiled against him
within 30 days, or he was acquitted at trial;
or
(iii) the record of any proceedings against
him has been sealed under Subsection (1).
(b) If the court finds that the petitioner is eligible for relief under this subsection, it shall issue its order granting the expungement and sealing.
(c) This subsection applies to all arrests and
any proceedings which occurred before, as well as
those which may occur after, April 27, 1987.
(d) The court shall enter an order to seal all
records in the petitioner's case which are in the
custody of that court, or any other court, or any
state, county, or local entity, agency, or official.
(e) The petitioner shall distribute the orders of
expungement and sealing to all affected agencies
and officials including the court, the arresting
agency, booking agency, Department of Corrections, and the bureau. The bureau shall forward
a copy of the expungement order to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The bureau shall provide a list of the agencies named in this subsection and clear written directions regarding the
requirements of this section to the petitioner.
(3) The person who has received expungement and
sealing of an arrest or conviction may answer an inquiring employer as though the arrest or conviction
did not occur.
(4) The court may permit inspection of the sealed
records only upon petition by the person who i6 the
subject of those records and only to the persons
named in the petition.
(5) (a) The bureau shall keep, index, and maintain all expunged and sealed records of arrests
and convictions. Any agency or its employee who
receives an expungement order may not divulge
any information in the sealed expunged records
Employees of the bureau may not divulge any
information contained in its index to any person
or agency without a court order, except for certification of an applicant for peace officer status, or
for use by the Board of Pardons.
(b) For judicial sentencing, a court may order
any records sealed under this section to be
opened and admitted into evidence. The records
are confidential and are available for inspection
only by the court, parties, counsel for the parties,
and any other person who is authorized by the
court to inspect them. At the end of the action or
proceeding, the court shall order the records
sealed again.
(6) A person who willfully violates any provision o(
this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(7) (a) The clerk of the court where the arrest,
conviction, and expungement occurred may
charge a fee of $50 under Section 78-3-16.5 or
78-4-24 for processing the expungement order
(b) The bureau may charge a reasonable fee
for processing the expungement order under Section 63-38-3.
litti

208

77-18-3. Disposition of fines.
Fines imposed by the district court shall be paid
into the General Fund, except fines received in counties that are not within the state district court administrative system. Those fines shall be paid to the
county treasurer.
ie88
77-18-4. Sentence — Term — Construction.
Whenever a person is convicted of a crime and the
judgment provides for a commitment to the state
prison, the court shall not fix a definite term of imprisonment unless otherwise provided by law. The
sentence and judgment of imprisonment shall be for
an indeterminate term of not less than the minimum
and not to exceed the maximum term provided by law
for the particular crime. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, every sentence, regardless of
its form or terms, which purports to be for a shorter or
different period of time, shall be construed to be a
sentence for the term between the minimum and
maximum periods of time provided by law and shall
continue until the maximum period has been reached
unless sooner terminated or commuted by authority
of the Board of Pardons.
i980
77-18-5.

Reports by courts and prosecuting attorneys to Board of Pardons.
In cases where an indeterminate sentence is imposed, the judge and prosecuting attorney may,
within 30 days, mail a statement to the Board of Pardons setting forth the term for which the prisoner
ought to be imprisoned together with any information
which might aid the board in passing on the application for termination or commutation of the sentence
or for parole or pardon.
1980
77-18-5.5.

J u d g m e n t of death — Defendant to
select method — Time of selection.
When a person is convicted of a capital offense and
the judgment of death has been imposed, the defendant is entitled to select, at the time of sentencing,
either a firing squad or a lethal intravenous injection
as the method of execution. If the defendant does not
indicate a preference at that time to the court, the
judgment of death shall be executed by lethal intravenous injection
1888
77-18-6.

Judgment to pay fine or restitution
constitutes a lien.
A judgment which orders the payment of a fine or
payment of restitution to a victim pursuant to Section
76-3-201 constitutes a lien when recorded in the judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in
a civil action
1983
77-18-7.

Costs imposed on defendant — Restrictions.
Unless specifically authorized by statute, a defendant shall not be required to pay court costs in a
criminal case either as a part of a sentence or as a
condition of probation or dismissal
1980
77-18-8. Fine not paid — Commitment.
Wh«T, .i defendant is sentenced to pay a fine in
«i<i<:iin'.M i«» ,t ,.-.,• xit .-. ;.iison sentence and the judgment is that ihe jaii or prison sentence be suspended
upon payment of the fine, the service of the jail or
prison sentence shall satisfy the judgment If a defendant fails to pav the fine and thereafter the court
finds ihat 0,e defendant failed to make a good faith
efloit to pa\ th.' !in»-. the court may, after a hearing,
order the e.\fi\jtion of the suspended jail or prison
sentence 11 a defendant is sentenced to pay a fine

897

STATUTES

covery of a penalty or forfeiture incurred, shall be
affected by the repeal, but the proceedings may be
conformed to the provisions of these revised statutes
as far as consistent.
1953
68-2-10. "Heretofore" and "hereafter" defined.
The terms "heretofore" and "hereafter," as used in
these revised statutes, have relation to the time when
the same take effect.
1953
CHAPTER 3
CONSTRUCTION
Section
68-3-1.
68-3-2.

68-3-3.
68-3-4.
68-3-5.
68-3-6.
68-3-7.
68-3-8.
68-3-9.
68-3-10.
68-3-11.
68-3-12.
68-3-13.

Common law adopted.
Statutes in derogation of common law
liberally construed — Rules of equity
prevail.
Retroactive effect.
Civil and criminal remedies not merged.
Effect of repeal.
Identical provisions deemed a continuation, not new enactment.
Time, how computed.
When a day appointed is a holiday.
Seal, how affixed.
Joint authority is authority to majority.
Rules of construction a s . t o words and
phrases.
Rules of construction.
Printing boldface in numbered bills —
Purpose — Effect — Power of Office of
Legislative Research and General
Counsel to change.

68-3-1. Common law adopted.
The common law of England so far as it is not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the constitution or
laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws
of this state, and so far only as it is consistent with
and adapted to the natural and physical conditions of
this state and the necessities of the people hereof, is
hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in all
courts of this state.
1953
68-3-2.

Statutes in derogation of c o m m o n law
liberally construed — Rules of equity
prevail.
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes
establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects
to which they relate, and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to
promote justice. Whenever there is any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of common
law in reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail.
1953
68-3-3. Retroactive effect.
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.
1953
68-3-4. Civil and criminal remedies not merged.
When the violation of a right admits of both a civil
and criminal remedy, the right to prosecute the one is
not merged in the other.
1953
68-3-5. Effect of repeal.
The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute

68-3-12

any action or proceeding commenced under or by virtue of the statute repealed.
1953
68-3-6.

Identical provisions deemed a continuation, not n e w enactment.
The provisions of any statute, so far as they are the
same as those of any prior statute, shall be construed
as a continuation of such provisions, and not as a new
enactment.
1953
68-3-7. Time, h o w computed.
The time in which any act provided by law is to be
done is computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last is a holiday, and then
it also is excluded.
1953
68-3-8. When a day appointed is a holiday.
Whenever any act of a secular nature, other than a
work of necessity or mercy, is appointed by law or
contract to be performed upon a particular day, which
day falls upon a holiday, such act may be performed
upon the next succeeding business day with the same
effect as if it had been performed upon the day appointed.
1953
68-3-9. Seal, h o w affixed.
When the seal of a court or public officer is required
by law to be affixed to any paper, the word "seal"
includes an impression of such seal upon the paper
alone, as well as upon wax or a wafer affixed thereto.
In all other cases the word "seal" may include a scroll
printed or written.
1953
68-3-10. Joint authority is authority to majority.
Words giving a joint authority to three or more
public officers, or other persons, are to be construed
as giving such authority to a majority of them, unless
it is otherwise expressed in the act giving the authority.
1953
68-3-11.

Rules of construction as to w o r d s and
phrases.
Words and phrases are to be construed according to
the context and the approved usage of the language;
but technical words and phrases, and such others as
have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in
law, or are defined by statute, are to be construed
according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning
or definition.
1953
68-3-12. Rules of construction.
(1) In the construction of these statutes, the following general rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature or repugnant to the context of
the statute:
(a) The singular number includes the plural,
and the plural the singular.
(b) Words used in one gender comprehend the
other.
(c) Words used in the present tense include the
future.
(2) In the construction of these statutes, the following definitions shall be observed, unless the definition would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of
the Legislature, or repugnant to the context of the
statute:
(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means:
(i) all actions by a board, commission, department, officer, or other administrative
unit of the state that determine the legal
riffht*?
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